Conjunctive hydrology gives rise to reciprocal externalities between hydraulically connected ground and surface water. A partial equilibrium model was formulated for an n-node groundwater surface water conjunctive use in which economic equilibrium was defined by a system of complementary slackness equations. Using Mixed Complementary Programming, a three node example was parameterized using site specific data and functional forms applied to the general model. This example was solved for equilibrium water prices and quantities in the respective surface and ground water markets. The model provided a functional framework for cost/benefit analysis of three policy scenarios in the presence of reciprocal conjunctive use externalities: (1) Pigouvian tax/subsidy, (2) elimination of the externality through conservation infrastructure, and (3) aquifer recharge. The Pigouvian policy yielded the highest social welfare followed by the payment for aquifer recharge. Conservation that eliminated the externality decreased social welfare.
Introduction
Exploding municipal, energy, agricultural and environmental water demands are colliding with limited or diminishing supplies. Policies and projects that would increase water supplies through cost prohibitive or environmentally unacceptable new infrastructure are being replaced by those that would reduce demand and/or redistribute supplies. Agriculture, being the least valued and largest water user (over 80% of water diversions in the West, Hutson et. al 2004) is the principal target of the imperative to allocate and use water more efficiently.
The conventional water planning approaches of supply or demand management fail to adequately evaluate efficient water project or allocation. Supply management first forecasts a perfectly inelastic water requirement then calculates the prices to recover costs (Howitt and Lund, 1999) . Demand management ignores water supply elasticity and focuses on reducing water demand through regulation, conservation, or infrastructure. In rejecting the elasticity of the opposing supply or demand blade of Marshall's scissors, both approaches disregard the value of water. Furthermore, conventional analyses are too often conducted piece-meal, for a specific water project, irrigation district or municipality, detached from the basin-wide hydrology and regional economic structure.
From a hydrologic perspective, groundwater and surface water form an integrated hydrologic system. To manage surface and subsurface water resources efficiently requires conjunctive water accounting and modeling tools capable of simulating the interactions between surface water storage or conveyances (rivers, canals, and drains) and groundwater recharge from those sources. Aquifers created or sustained by irrigation activities extend over vast areas in every western state. In the aquifers of California's Central Valley, virtually all recharge is from "infiltration of irrigation water" (Alley et al. 2002) . Aquifers in Idaho's Eastern Snake River Plain (Cosgrove, Contor, and Johnson, 2006) , and Lower Boise Valley, Nebraska's North Platte, Colorado's South Platte (Howe, 2002 ) and Washington's Columbia River Basin, are also sustained largely by seepage from canals, off-stream reservoirs, or on-farm infiltration. Shakir et al. (2011) raised alarm concerning the impact of canal water shortages on the conjunctive groundwater in the Punjab. Schmidt et al. (2013) estimated that about 45% of Boise Project diversions in the Lower Boise River Basin are consumptively used by canal irrigated crops, with the remainder either recharging the shallow aquifer or discharging to drains.
Externalities occur when the economic activities of one entity affect those of another and pecuniary remuneration is wanting (Mishan 1971; Baumol and Oates, 1988) . Meade (1952) illustrated a positive reciprocal production externality using the classic example of bees providing nectar for honey and pollination for apples. In contrast to Meade's positive/positive reciprocal externality, conjunctive (joined or connected) surface water and groundwater use is capable of producing a positive/negative reciprocal externality. Groundwater pumpers near a canal enjoy a positive externality of canal seepage while inflicting a negative externality of pumping-induced seepage upon the canal user. The wells which extract tepid water from these hydrologically connected canals have been aptly labeled "warm water wells" (Strauch 2009 ).
Water management decisions are often made without regard to exiting surface/subsurface hydrologic connections or the benefits/costs to other water users in the basin (Booker et al., 2012; Evans, 2010) . In many Western states, groundwater and surface water conjunctive property rights are poorly defined or non-existent and lack compensation mechanisms to sustain or curtail conjunctive use, which promulgates externalities (e.g. Strawn, 2004; Evans 2010; Blomquist et. al. 2001 ). The resulting conjunctive use externalities cause a divergence between private and social benefit/cost, with price/market institutions failing to sustain desirable activities or curtail undesirable activities (Bator, 1958) . Omission of conjunctive use externalities also compromises basin-wide cost/benefit analysis (CBA) as required for Federal water project planning (U.S. Water Resources Council 1983; Council on Environmental Quality 2009).
The overarching objective of our study is to demonstrate a generalized coupled hydrologic and economic modeling methodology for conducting basin-wide CBA that recognizes conjunctive use externalities. The tasks to achieve that goal are threefold: (1) demonstrate a functional model of conjunctive surface and ground water hydrologic interactions as conjunctive use externalities, (2) formulate a spatial partial equilibrium model in which economic equilibrium is defined by a system of complementary slackness equations, and (3) perform cost/benefit analysis (CBA) of alternative water policies aimed at addressing the market failures and inefficient water use resulting from conjunctive use externalities.
Methods
Within the taxonomy of hydro-economic models, conjunctive use of surface water and groundwater is a distinct category of research (Harou et al. 2009 ). Burt's (1964) foundational research treated conjunctive groundwater and surface water use as substitutes in an inventory problem with uncertain supply and controlled demand. The linear programming methods of optimal recharge and conjunctive groundwater and surface water use (Milligan and Clyde 1970; O'Mara and Duloy 1984) have been eclipsed by optimal control methods. Noel et al. (1980) used an optimal control model to determine tax on pumping for the socially optimal spatial and temporal allocation of groundwater and surface water. Tsur (1990 Tsur ( , 1991 , and Tsur and GrahamTomasi (1991) extended Burt's optimal control framework with uncertain surface water supplies. Azaiez (2002) developed a multi-staged decision model to optimize conjunctive use of groundwater and surface water with artificial recharge. Burness and Martin (1988) determined an efficient pumping rate to recharge a tributary aquifer to a steady-state aquifer condition from a perennially losing and hydraulically connected stream. Pongkijvorasin and Roumasset (2007) expanded upon the static framework of Chakravorty and Umetsu (2005) with an optimal control model of canal water use and groundwater extraction. Groundwater users were recipients of two positive externalities, canal conveyance loss and on-farm return flows to the aquifer. In summary, conjunctive use research has largely focused on the optimal groundwater and surface water use and optimal aquifer recharge. Despite the explicit label of conjunctive use as an externality, the hydrologic connection has not been treated as an externality created by interrelated supply functions.
Two approaches have been taken to the integration of hydrologic with economic models; network simulation and optimization (Harou et al. 2009 ). Beginning with Maass et al. (1962) , hydrologic systems have been modeled as networks of water storage, with demand and supply nodes linked by the conveyance structures of rivers, canals, and pipelines. The network simulation approach conjoins a hydrologic network model e.g. a river-reservoir prior appropriations water allocation model (MODSIM, Labadie et. al 1994) with a system-wide agricultural optimization model (Hamilton et al., 1999 and Houck et al. 2008) . While network simulation models have the necessary basin spatial dimension, these models are limited to addressing "what if" questions and cannot maximize social welfare, necessary to address market failures of conjunctive use externalities and conduct CBA of water projects and policies.
The partial equilibrium optimization model was introduced in the water literature by Flinn and Guise (1970) , who adopted the concept of interregional trade modeling as developed by . Howe and Easter (1971) used the trading model concept to evaluate large-scale inter-basin water transfers. Cummings (1974) introduced water benefit and supply cost functions within a linear programming context representing nonlinear benefit measures by piecewise linearization. Vaux and Howitt (1984) formulated the first regional water-trading model linking water demand and supply sectors to demonstrate the costeffectiveness of reallocation of water from existing uses as opposed to development of new supplies. Booker and Young (1994) elaborated upon the water-trading framework, to contrast benefits of intrastate versus interstate water transfers with salinity and hydroelectric demand also determining the benefits of water transfers. Further extensions used sequential and dynamic aspects to analyze and climate or drought on interregional water allocation (Booker, 1995; Booker and Ward, 1999) .
Partial Equilibrium Model
Following , partial equilibrium models have been cast as an optimization problem, where a quasi-welfare or net social function is maximized subject to constraints, and equilibrium is assumed to be the optimal point that maximizes this objective function. When Takayama and Judge published their book in the early 1970's (Takayama and Judge, 1971 ) numerical optimization techniques were well understood but mixed complementary programming (MCP) was in its infancy. With the advent of GAMS (Brooke et al., 1988) and accompanying solvers, the equilibrium equations can be formulated as complementary slackness equations in a mixed complementary problem and solved directly. The alternative is to formulate an objective function optimization problem and assume that the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions coincide with the equilibrium conditions (see Kjeldsen 2000) . (1a) ( )
, ensures locational price equilibrium, by equating the sum of supply price and transportation cost with demand price. Equations 4a state that, at equilibrium, if the demand price is greater than zero, quantity demanded must equal the sum of all shipments to that node from all supply nodes.
Equations 5a state that, at equilibrium, if the supply price is greater than zero, all shipments from a supply node must equal the total quantity produced at that node. Equations 4a and 5a ensure market quantity equilibrium.
Partial Equilibrium with Conjunctive Use Externalities
The conjunctive hydrologic connection creates a Meade production externality where supply functions of groundwater and canal water users become interrelated. The conjunctive use externality is one-way or reciprocal depending on the surface water and groundwater connection, and positive (e.g. aquifer recharge) or negative (e.g. reduced canal flows) depending on the recipient's production function. When a leaky canal is not hydraulically connected to the aquifer, the canal water user gifts the groundwater pumper with a one-way positive externality of passive seepage (i.e. independent of pumping). The canal user's water demand is thus an argument in the supply function of the groundwater pumper but the pumper's demand is not an argument in the canal supply function. When a leaky canal is hydraulically connected to the aquifer and a hydraulic gradient exists as a result of pumping, the groundwater pumper reciprocates by inflicting a negative externality of pumping-induced seepage on the canal user. With a reciprocal externality, passive and pumping-induced canal seepage enter into the supply function of the groundwater pumper as a positive externality, and the pumper inflicts a negative externality of induced seepage upon the canal water user as an additional transportation cost. Production externalities necessitate the specification of interrelated supply equations of the equilibrium conditions 2a, 3a, and 4a of the basic model. Equations 1a and 5a, which do not contain supply expressions, are thus unchanged from the basic model. In contrast to 2a, where price equals only pecuniary marginal costs ( ( )) i i P q , at equilibrium price equals pecuniary and externality marginal cost , ( ( ,{ })
With the reciprocal externality, the locational price equilibrium equations (3a) must account for the marginal cost of seepage in equating supply price at node i with the demand price at node j (i.e. the marginal cost of seepage at the head of the canal with demand price at the end of the 
, so that 3a becomes:
thus states, that at equilibrium, if the quantity traded is greater than zero, the sum of supply price and transportation cost (i.e. seepage cost) must equal demand price. If the demand price at node j is greater than 0, then at equilibrium, the quantity demanded must equal total quantity transported less seepage:
. With the reciprocal externality, the excess demand for canal water is eliminated by:
A reciprocal conjunctive use externality is illustrated with an example of a leaky canal that recharges an aquifer used by a groundwater pumper (Figure 1 ). Three nodes define three respective markets. Node 1 is a canal company at the head of the canal with an exogenous marginal cost; 1 1 ( ) P q . Node 1 supplies water through a leaky canal to Node 2 (a farm at the canal terminus) that has an exogenous demand; 2 2 ( ) P q . Node 2 lacks an exogenous supply function but faces an effective supply of canal water from Node 1 minus the canal seepage. The conveyance arc between Node 1 and 2 is the leaky canal. The exogenous seepage function {3},1,2 S , analogous to transportation shrinkage of canal water conveyed from the canal head (Node 1) to canal end (Node 2), determines recharge of the aquifer used by Node 3. The farm at Node 3 is supplied by an aquifer that is in part recharged by canal seepage and has a demand for pumped water; 3 3 ( ) P q . Node2 sole water source is the canal. Node 3 water source is seepage from the canal (both passive and induced) and aquifer recharge from sources other than the canal. The marginal cost function for groundwater at Node 3 equals the pecuniary marginal costs 3 3
( ( )) P q and the externality of seepage gifted by Node 2, {3},1,2 S . The indices for the example are thus;
Economic equilibrium is defined by the system of complementary slackness equations (2b, 3b and 4b). The endogenous equilibrium prices 1 2 3 , , and    and quantities 1 2 3 , ,and q , can be determined by solving the complementary slackness equations using MCP or by maximizing a social welfare objective function (e.g. Booker and Young 1994; Booker and Ward, 1999) . In our example, complementary slackness conditions were programmed in GAMS and solved using the PATH solver (Ferris and Munson 1999) . Equilibrium prices and quantities are then limits on the respective consumer and producer surplus integrals.
Exogenous Functions
The two exogenous demand functions (Node 2 demand at the end of the canal and Node 3 demand at the well head); two exogenous marginal cost functions (Node 1 supply at the head of the canal and Node 3 supply of groundwater at the well head), and an exogenous transportation cost of canal seepage are outlined below and detailed with data in the Appendix.
Typically, hydro-economic models represent hydrology through constraints (Booker et al., 2012) . In contrast, the conjunctive hydrologic connection of the seepage function is an argument in both the groundwater and canal water supply functions and thus the seepage function defines the reciprocal externality. The aquifer, from which Node 3 pumps, is recharged by two sources, canal seepage and so-called far-field sources at the boundaries of the hydrologic model. Seepage is a convex function of the amount of water conveyed in the canal from Node 1 to Node 2 (X (12) ) and the amount of pumping by Node 3 (q 3 ):
Total seepage ( {3},1,2 S ) is the sum of: (1) ). Marginal seepage with respect to canal diversion is:
(1,2) X MS is thus downward sloping. As more water is diverted into the canal seepage increases and the water table beneath the canal rises. As the water table connects with the canal over an increasing length of canal, the head gradient between the canal and aquifer is reduced, so that as
Marginal seepage with respect to pumping is:
MS is thus downward sloping --with increased pumping (ceteris paribus the canal head condition) the water table declines, the aquifer becomes disconnected from the canal (over a greater length of the canal), and the pumper is less able to induce seepage i.e. as P k  ) and 2  is the price at Node 2. In our example, the total charge at the head of the canal equals k 1 X 1 where k 1 is a fixed O&M charge, thus
is thus the sum of exogenous levy at canal head plus the externality of 1,2 X MS which is determined in part by the amount of pumping (q 3 ) of Node 3. The quantity of water delivered to Node 2 at the end of the canal is the quantity at the head of the canal net of canal seepage. Downward sloping seepage costs are added to a fixed levy resulting in an effective supply cost at Node 2 which declines as diversion increases.
The marginal cost of groundwater to Node 3 at the well head is:
is a fixed pumping cost, k 3 is the power cost per foot of pumping lift, and pumping lift is;
is thus a function of the exogenous pumping cost parameters plus the canal seepage externality, as determined by the actions of Node 2. As pumping increases, the water (1 )
, where β 0 , β 1 , and β 2 and is parameterized using case specific agronomic data on crop yield, evapotranspiration, irrigation application, and irrigation efficiency, and commodity prices (see appendix, Contor et al., 2008) .
Results and Analysis
Externalities result in undesirable market behavior when market institutions fail to sustain desirable activities or reduce undesirable activities (Bator, 1958) . A Pigouvian wedge thus arises between private and social cost/benefit, with positive externalities under produced and negative externalities over produced. The reciprocal conjunctive use externalities result in failures in the surface water and groundwater markets; the positive externality of passive seepage is under produced and the negative externality of induced seepage is over produced.
Using the above three node example, three scenarios were developed to illustrate the application of partial equilibrium modeling with conjunctive use externalities. The first scenario is a Pigouvian tax/subsidy internalization of the reciprocal externalities. The two subsequent scenarios are common management alternatives intended to mitigate conjunctive use externalities; (1) eliminating the externality with water conservation infrastructure and (2) augmenting the externality with managed aquifer recharge. Equilibrium prices, quantities and surpluses for each scenario are reported in Table 1 . The Pigouvian tax/subsidy and aquifer recharge scenario results are displayed in Figure 2a and 2b and Figures 3a and 3b , respectively.
The figures illustrated three points: (1) the production externality of conjunctive use shifts only supply the functions, (2) the CBA that is performed numerically and can be illustrated graphically (Griffin 1998) and (3) the tax/subsidy that eliminates the wedge between the private and social causes a feedback in the reciprocal groundwater or canal water market.
Baseline
The baseline is the "without" scenario in the with-versus-without evaluation required by CBA. In the baseline, the leaky canal is connected to the aquifer. The groundwater pumper receives a positive externality of reduced pumping lift from canal seepage and pumping inflicts a negative externality upon canal user by inducing additional seepage. Evident in the equilibrium prices and quantities is the rudimentary water budget for the baseline. In the canal water market, 
Pigouvian Tax/Subsidy
In a competitive equilibrium, the welfare of two agents depends only on consequences of their own choices. An externality creates an asymmetry between social and private prices.
Internalization forces both agents to account for the consequences of their actions on the other's welfare by aligning prices. Absent internalization (i.e. the base case), the canal water user responds only to the pecuniary supply cost of the canal company and the shrinkage cost of seepage. Ignored is the reduction in costs that the pumper receives from canal seepage. Similarly, the pumper is signaled only by the pecuniary cost of pumping, ignoring the cost to the canal diverter of pumping-induced seepage. A Pigouvian tax/subsidy internalizes the externality, by aligning marginal supply prices of canal diverters and groundwater pumpers. The price alignment signals to decrease production of the negative externality (pumping induced seepage) and increase production of the positive externality (canal diversions that create seepage).
To internalize the reciprocal conjunctive use externality, the canal water supply function is redefined as the pecuniary marginal cost at Node 1 plus the negative externality of seepage in the transportation of water from Node 1 to Node 2 plus a Pigouvian subsidy. The subsidy equals the reduction in marginal cost that canal seepage provides the Node 3 groundwater pumper. To determine the subsidy, the price linkage equation (3b) which equates canal water demand prices with the sum of supply prices (including seepage and transportation costs) is replaced with equation 3c: at equilibrium, if the quantity of water diverted in the canal is greater than zero, the sum of supply price, and seepage cost plus the Pigouvian subsidy equals the demand price.
Similarly, the groundwater supply function is redefined as the pecuniary cost of pumping at Node 3 plus the marginal cost of pumping induced canal seepage to the canal diverter at Node 2. To determine the tax, the price linkage equation (2b) which equates groundwater demand price with supply price is replaced with equation 2c: the quantity of groundwater pumped is greater than zero, the pumping cost plus the Pigouvian tax equals the demand price. Together, α and  monetize or price canal seepage in both the surface water market and the groundwater market, and equations 2c and 3c ensure the existence of a social optimum at equilibrium.
The Pigouvian tax/subsidy aligns prices to erase the wedge between social and private costs in surface water and groundwater markets that arise from the canal seepage externalities.
However the reciprocal nature of the externalities means that the tax/subsidy accounts for only a portion of the total wedge between social and private supply cost. A portion of the wedge in each market is erased through feedback from the other market. The imposition of an optimal tax on Node 3 pumping and an optimal subsidy for Node 2 canal diversion nevertheless insures that the marginal benefit of canal seepage to groundwater pumpers matches the marginal cost of seepage to the canal diverter.
In the surface water market, the Pigouvian subsidy shifts the supply function downward from the baseline (Figure 2a ). At equilibrium, Node 1 supplies 3,692AF to Node 2 (an increase of 595AF over the base case) for which Node 2 is willing-to-pay $8.31/AF. The Pigouvian subsidy (β) for canal diversion is $9.23/AF. Node 2 pays Node 1 $55,383 ($15*3,692) which includes seepage costs of $17,250 (1,150*$15). Assuming the base case canal diverter supply function without the subsidy, but the scenario 2 rate of diversion and pumping, the equilibrium price at Node 2 is $21.61/AF (Figure 2a ) (see endnote 2). The total wedge between social and private cost in the surface water market is therefore $13.30 ($21.61 -$8.31) . Of this, $9.23 is erased by the canal diversion subsidy (A to B in Figure 1a ) and $4.07 is erased by feedback from the groundwater market (B to C in Figure 2a) . The feedback is a consequence of the tax on groundwater pumping which reduces pumping and thereby the induced component of canal seepage.
In the groundwater market, the Pigouvian tax shifts the supply function upward from the baseline (Figure 2b ). At equilibrium, the Pigouvian tax (α) on pumping is $0.45/AF. However, as a consequence of the combined tax and subsidy, pumping increases by 23AF (1,306 -1,283), and the price of groundwater declines from $30.65/AF to $25.72/AF. Again, assuming the base case groundwater pumper supply function without the tax, but the rate of diversion and pumping, the wedge between social and private cost in the groundwater market is $5.01 ($30.73-$25.72) (figure 1b). The $0.45/AF tax, on pumping has the intended effect of reducing induced canal seepage, although it actually increases the wedge between private and social groundwater supply (A to B in Figure 2b ). The wedge in supply is only erased by the $5.46 feedback from the surface water market (B to C in Figure 2b ) (see endnote 3). The reciprocal externality produces feedback between the surface and groundwater markets that reinforces or cancels the tax/subsidy effect.
In the groundwater market, the subsidy increases canal diversion which then increases seepage available for pumping which more than offsets the tax induced reduction in pumping. Despite taxing the negative externality of pumping, the marginal cost of pumping declines (internalized supply, Figure 2b ) and pumping increases from the private equilibrium (1283) to the social equilibrium (1306).
Internalization with a tax/subsidy increases the welfare of both groundwater pumper and canal diverter. In the with-versus-without CBA comparison, total irrigator surplus increased by 21% over baseline. In the groundwater market, consumer surplus increased by 10% ($64,242 to $70,625) , and in the surface water market consumer surplus increases by 34% ($90,900 to $121,986). The benefit of seepage received by Node 3 outweighs the tax levy and the subsidy received by Node 2 outweighs the seepage loss. As tax and subsidy, and  generate an optimal social equilibrium, neither can be increased or decreased without being offset by greater social cost or reduced social benefit. A complete market now exists where trade is unimpeded, thus ensuring by definition, the gains in efficiency from trade (Randall, 1983) . The Pigouvian incentive requires exogenous cash flows i.e. collected tax revenues are received and subsidy is funded by an external agent. A tax paid to the injured party (canal user) or a subsidy paid by the beneficiary (pumper) distorts the tax/subsidy incentive (Baumol and Oates, 1988) .
Correcting the market failure by omniscient regulation of the reciprocal externality requires pumping restrictions and canal diversion increases. Regulation of induced seepage damage alone (e.g. a binding constrain on pumping) will simply reproduce the equilibrium quantities and welfare of the baseline scenario. Prior appropriations regulations to protect senior canal or river rights from the damage of induced seepage are usually enforced as well setbacks or outright bans. For example, Oregon (Oregon Water Resources Department 2010) mandates a quarter mile set back from the river for wells in a riparian aquifer. Absent damage to the senior water users, prior appropriations regulation cannot compel canal users to "waste water" for aquifer recharge (Fereday et. al 2006) . Regulation is thus limited to pumping restrictions reduces the benefit derived from passive seepage intended to prevent the damage of pumping-induced seepage.
Eliminating the Externality
The externality can be eliminated by lining the leaky canal. Canal lining is promoted as conservation panacea that maintains agricultural production, while liberating water for environmental or municipal use (Rodgers 2008; Hanak et al. 2010) . Millions have been expended to subsidize agricultural water conservation by either reducing on-farm infiltration or improving conveyance efficiency. CBA for water conservation infrastructure are required to account for the costs and benefits, including those of the current recipients of the seepage externality.
When the canal is lined the cost of seepage is no longer imposed upon the canal diverter.
The quantity supplied by Node 1 (2,327AF) equals the quantity demanded at Node 2, making Node 1 supply price ($15) equal to Node 2 demand price. Canal diverter demand increases 196AF (2,327 -2,130). Absent canal seepage, aquifer levels decline, pumping cost increases from $30.65 to $95.24/AF and pumping declines by 875AF (1,283-408). Surface water market consumer surplus increased by 16% ($90,900 to $105,709), offset by a decrease in consumer and producer surplus in the groundwater market by 64%. Total surplus, the CBA of with-versuswithout comparison, declined 67% ($110,239 to $164,087). In our example, construction costs are ignored and the sole beneficiary of canal lining is the short run increase in irrigation intensity of the existing crop mix and acreage of the canal water user.
Aquifer Recharge
As illustrated in previous research, aquifer recharge is an accepted policy in conjunctive use management (Blomquist et al. 2001) . In contrast to the external Pigouvian tax/subsidy flows, aquifer recharge payments are internal --the junior appropriator pay to receive the benefit or compensate for damages to the senior. As the case with most conjunctive hydrology situations, the pumper has an adjudicated right that is junior to the canal user whose seepage created the aquifer. Thus, in our example, the junior pumpers compensate the senior canal users for increased diversions to recharge the aquifer. Diversions for recharge are assumed to occur during the irrigation season, rival with canal demand.
Canal diversion is priced via a payment from Node 3 to Node 2 that matches the decrease in total pumping cost attributable to the seepage resulting from canal diversion. The payment is calculated by integrating the groundwater pumpers' marginal cost function with respect to pumping yields total pumping cost, and differentiating with respect to canal diversion to yield the marginal cost of pumping with respect to diversion: Equation 3d states, that at equilibrium, if canal diversion is greater than zero, the sum of supply price, transportation and seepage costs, minus the payment from groundwater pumpers equals the canal diverter's marginal demand price.
Equations 2d states, that at equilibrium, if the quantity of groundwater pumping is greater than zero, the marginal cost of pumping plus the seepage payment to canal diverters equals the groundwater pumper's marginal demand price.
In the groundwater market, the transfer payment raises the marginal cost of pumping and thus shifts the supply function upward from the baseline (Figure 3b ). The transfer payment from Node 3 to Node 2 increases Node 3 marginal cost by $21.04/AF ($51.68 -$30.65) relative to the base case scenario. As a consequence, groundwater pumping decreases by 159AF (1,283 -1124) relative to the base case.
In the surface water market, the transfer payment lowers the marginal cost of deliveries to the end of canal and thus shifts the supply function downward from the baseline (Figure 3a ). In the surface water market, the transfer payment reduces Node 2 marginal cost by $11.86 ($21.65-$9.79) from the base case. As a result, the quantity of water shipped from Node 1 to Node 2 increases by 506AF (3604 -3097) and Node 2 increases demand by 362AF ( $29,447 ($8.17 × 3,604) i.e. the decrease in total pumping cost attributable to the seepage resulting from canal diversion.
In the surface water market, Node 2 consumer surplus increased by 30% ($90,900 to $118,253); (A+B+C) -A in figure 3a ). In the groundwater market, consumer surplus for Node 3 decreased by 40% ($64,242 to $38,737); (A+B+C+D) -A in figure 3b ). Node 3 producer surplus increases 282%, from $8,946 (E+F+G in figure 3b ) to $34,214 (B+E in figure 3b ). The big increase in Node 3 producer surplus is attributable to the payment made to Node 2. The groundwater pumper is better off paying for relatively cheap electricity than paying the canal diverter for relatively costly seepage water. The managed recharge alternative lifts net social welfare above the baseline by 17% ($164,087 to $191,204) . Even after making payments for canal seepage, the groundwater pumpers' surplus is not exhausted. The surplus of Node 2 canal diverters damaged by the negative externality of pumping induced seepage increases with receipt of payment from groundwater pumpers. Although the managed recharge scenario does not penalize pumping induced seepage, the CBA social benefit from this scenario exceeds that of the baseline status quo.
In contrast to the Pigouvian tax and subsidy that corrects both sides of the reciprocal externality, only the positive externality of seepage is addressed by the recharge payment. The negative externality of induced seepage, addressed by a payment from the canal to the pumper to curtail pumping, is left uncorrected. The recharge payment addresses the market failure in that the senior appropriator canal user cannot be compel to "waste water" to sustain the positive externality of seepage to the aquifer (Fereday et al. 2006) . The property right establishes that the pumper needs to pay for passive seepage that he previously received free. While payment is a potential remedy for the market failure the necessity for property rights contravenes a long standing principle of prior appropriation; the loss of physical control of water, whether through surface returns or percolation to aquifers, returns the water to public ownership.
Conclusions
Aquifers created or sustained by surface water are a global phenomenon. Previous research on conjunctive use failed to treat conjunctive ground and surface water use as an externality of un-priced and interrelated supply functions. Reciprocal conjunctive use externalities thus result in failures in both surface and groundwater markets.
Per our goal of functionality, an n-dimension generalized partial equilibrium model of conjunctive groundwater and surface water use was formulated. Using MCP, a three node example was parameterized with site-specific data and was solved for equilibrium water prices and quantities in the respective surface water and groundwater markets. The three exogenous variables are: (1) demand, for various crops, irrigation technologies and scalable to any acreage, (2) supply, from pumping costs and canal company levies and (3) the transportation arc, a seepage function estimated from a groundwater model. Functionality was further demonstrated in the CBA performed on three conjunctive management policies; tax/subsidy, conservation, and aquifer recharge. A basin water budget, which accompanies groundwater models, can provide an external check on baseline scenario results. The partial equilibrium framework and data can be replicated; calculation of the demands and marginal costs are well documented but seepage functions deserve further research.
The Pigouvian tax/subsidy aligns private and social price to erase the wedge between private and social cost and when imposed on a one way externality results in an unambiguous decrease or increase of that externality. In contrast, the tax/subsidy on a reciprocal externality produces feedback between the markets that reinforces or cancels the tax/subsidy effect. In our example, the subsidy increased canal diversion which then increased seepage available for pumping which more than offsets the tax induced reduction in pumping. Pumping quantity at the social equilibrium (1306AF) increased over the private equilibrium (1283AF), despite taxing the negative externality of pumping. The feedback effect improves the welfare of the recipient -e.g. the tax discourages the negative externality of pumping to the benefit of canal and the subsidy encourages canal diversions to the benefit of the pumper. The magnitude of the feedback is determined by the relative magnitude and elasticity of exogenous supply, demand and transportation variables.
Of the three policy scenarios, internalizing the externalities via a tax/subsidy generated the greatest social benefit. Conservation failed the CBA --the foregone benefit of canal seepage to the pumpers by eliminating the externality outweighs the increase in canal benefit. In the recharge scenario, canal seepage is priced via a payment from pumper to canal water user that matches the decrease in total pumping cost attributable to the seepage resulting from canal diversion. In our example, total surplus of the recharge policy was 97% of the Pigouvian scenario. With the recharge payment, the equilibrium quantities, in all three markets, was only slightly less than the Pigouvian scenario. However, the price of water at node 3, driven by the payment, increased from $25.72 to $51.68.
Market failures arise from poorly assigned and/or enforced property rights. Governance often fails to legally acknowledge conjunctive hydrologic connections, let alone recognized conjunctive use as a reciprocal externality. The Prior Appropriation Doctrine defines and protects property rights not correct the externality by maximizing social welfare as does partial equilibrium framework. The lack of property right extends to both sides of the reciprocal externality: junior groundwater users are not forced to pay for the seepage that they now freely enjoy nor are senior canal users compensated for the damage of pumping induced seepage. Prior appropriation removes the incentive of seepage payments because once the seepage leaves the canal diverters control, the water reverts to the public domain to be appropriated for beneficial use. On other side of the reciprocal, the beneficiary of seepage has no mechanism to invite additional seepage. Absent damage to the senior water users, prior appropriations regulation cannot compel canal users to "waste water" for aquifer recharge (Fereday et. al 2006 Transfer Payment per Quantity Pumped n/a n/a n/a $8.17
Transfer Payment per Canal Quantity n/a n/a n/a Total Transfer Payment n/a n/a n/a $29,447
Pigiouvian Tax α $0.45
Pigouvian Subsidy β $9.23
Absent constraints the demand/ supply quantity node 3 will equal quantity shipped node3 to node 3 and the supply quantity node 1 will equal quantity shipped node3 to node 3. A constraints will also cause the Node 3 demand and supply price to be unequal. . The marginal benefit functions were calibrated for 825 acres of alfalfa at Node 2 with 45 % efficiency and an application rate of 3.5 AF/acre, and for 600 acres of alfalfa at Node 3 with 70 % irrigation efficiency and an application rate of 2.25AF/acre. The differences in efficiency reflect surface versus sprinkler application.
